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Abstract 
The article develops a sociological understanding of the lone mass shooter and the ways in 
which his affectual constellation is produced within and mirror the social space. It begins by 
outlining the contemporary political context of terrorism. The article then explores the 
affectual constellation of an isolated mass murderer, by asking the question ‘what is a loser?’ 
The article then links the emergence of the radical loser to modernity through an exploration 
of the genealogy of nihilism. Then, taking the mass murderer Elliot Rodger as a paradigmatic 
case it explores the ways in which his affectual constellation can be understood as produced 
within the capitalist social formation. Finally, it argues that mass murder can be understood 
as the ecstasy of simulated experience, its violent counter transference, constituting a zone of 
indistinction between the spectacle and the real, killing and being killed. 
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Introduction 
To begin it must be stated that the act of mass murder/suicide in and of itself is a kind of 
“empty signifier” in the sense meant by Laclau (2005: 69-76). The act is a constitutive shell, 
it does not have a pre-determined ideological content. However, that is not to say that a 
specific instance of mass murder/suicide is not ideologically motivated. Rather, mass 
murder/suicide can be thought of as an imperative, a form of action that is animated by a 
range of ideologies that vary across historical and social contexts. We have seen this form of 
act adopted by on the one hand white nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists, Christian 
fundamentalists and on the other hand mass murderers and school shooters who are not 
connected to a wider terrorist network. Despite the mass media consistently making a 
distinction between the terrorist acts of the networked fundamentalist and the acts of mass 
murder perpetrated by am “isolated, confused and angry young man” there are insufficient 
grounds in actuality to make a distinction between the acts and the tactics of the act at the 
micro level. Firstly, as I have already stated the act of mass murder/suicide does not have a 
pre-determined ideological content, secondly, as argued by Diken and Laustsen (2004:91) 
terror in the 21st century is “post-political” that is to say,  
 
Whereas the classical terror targeted political adversaries and aimed at a realization of 
a political program, the new terror is blind and diffuse. It operates stochastically and 
seldom demands something explicit from an identifiable adversary… Terror hits 
randomly: Anybody and everybody can be a potential target.  
 
The new terrorist’s choice of target is based upon the maximisation of death and destruction, 
hence the Manchester bomber and the Las Vegas shooters choice to target concerts and not 
specific individuals or political adversaries. Whereas once the terrorism in the modern, 
disciplinary society was perpetrated by an identifiable other who lived in the margins without 
“touching” the society (Diken and Laustsen, 2004:90). The new post-modern terrorism is the 
result of the objective conditions created by a singular hegemonic super power and the more 
this power consolidates on one network the more vulnerable this network is to attack 
(Baudrillard, 2003:405).  New terror is internal to globalisation which gives rise to a new 
post-modern fear that anyone could be a terrorist and terrorism can hit at any time in any 
place making everyone a potential target (Diken and Laustsen, 2004:91). For example, the 
white nationalist perpetrator of the Christchurch Mosque shootings was described by the 
manager of the gym he worked at for several years "as normal as one person as to the next" 
who "never showed any extremes of extremist views or any crazy behaviour" (Regan and 
Sidhu 2019). Thirdly, both fundamentalist terrorism and the terrorism of the lone gunman 
combine real death with the real time images of the event, be that via mass media outlets in 
the case of  the September 11th attack on the twin towers or filming and live streaming the 
attacks on the two Mosques’ in Christchurch. Indeed, the Christchurch shooters use of social 
media made the event viral and virtual, his video and manifesto were downloaded and shared 
across a range of websites, turning social networks into network/spectacles for the global 
distribution of terror in real time. As the journalist Wigham (2019) described the attack,  
 
the Christchurch shooting was carefully crafted for the internet age with its use of live 
streaming, the shouting out of popular meme slogans and the upload of his rambling 
manifesto replete with inside jokes geared to those steeped in underground internet 
subculture.  
 
Additionally, many mass murderers not associated with a particular extremist network (which 
is not to say their views are not extremist) make use of YouTube and mass media outlets as a 
way in which they can  advertise themselves, their act and the “Logic or philosophy” that 
motivated them (see Berardi, 2015:25-28).  Thus, in opposition to the media construction of 
this individual as a lone gunman I have stated that formally, on the microlevel, they cannot be 
distinguished from those connected to terrorist networks. From this perspective mass 
murderers or lone gunmen are terrorists. Significantly, the symbolic and suicidal dimensions 
of the new terrorism signify a nihilist refusal to accept the world as it is, the denial of any and 
all political authority and the attempt to destroy the socio symbolic order (see Diken, 
2008:28). The act is a radical nihilist gesture, the devaluation of the world in the name of 
valuations that cannot find a place in this world (Nietzsche, 1967:318). The act is thus not a 
neutral container, the meanings that fill it go beyond politics and ideology, aiming at the 
destruction of the self and the social. It is worth pointing out that the combination of self-
destruction and the destruction of the other mirrors Guattari’s (2008:169) concept of the 
Fascist war machine, which in its German and Italian forms is invested with a fantastic, 
collective “death instinct” with Hitler and the Nazis fighting for death, right up to and 
including the death of Germany; the German masses agreed to follow along and meet their 
own destruction”. Indeed, as remarked by Enzensberger (2005) the Nazi project from its 
inception was a suicidal one. Much like the Nazi party was a condensation of molecular 
Fascism, which is constituted by desires within the social space, we can argue that despite the 
fact many mass shooters are isolated individuals, it is not hard to see how these subjectivity’s 
become entangled and crystallise into various contemporary fascistic assemblages such as 
religious fanatics, white nationalists or even the involuntary celibates who have adopted the 
mass murderer Elliot Rodger as a patron saint of the movement. That being said, mass 
murder/suicide such as school shootings often remain at the level of the individual and it is 
not unreasonable to claim many resists being integrated by any ideology or wider terrorist 
networks: seeing their struggle as a personal struggle. However, I want to draw a minimal 
distinction between the fanatic terrorist networks and the lone shooter as firstly, this actor 
remains surprisingly under-researched in social theory. Secondly, I will argue that the 
isolated mass murderer and their increasing prevalence in contemporary society can be read 
as symptomatic of the neoliberal turn in late capitalism and the eclipse of the social by 
spectacles and simulations.  
 
The article begins by asking the question “what is a loser?” in contemporary social life. It 
explores the neoliberal ideological construction of winners and losers. It then draws a 
distinction between the loser and the radical loser and explores the affectual constellation of 
the radical loser. This constellation includes the affects of depression, spite, and resentment 
as well as the desire for recognition. Spite is the affect of most importance as following 
Diken (2008:27) spite is “a willingness to harm oneself in order to harm other’s; Thus, it 
encapsulates the logic of the constitutive shell that combines aggression with auto aggression, 
suicide with mass murder. The aim of this section is not to distil the absolute essence of mass 
murder/suicides. Rather, it aims to develop an ideal typical framework for its interpretation. 
Secondly, I will link the emergence of the radical loser to modernity through re-visiting the 
genealogy of nihilism as it provides a conceptual apparatus for thinking about the ways in 
which mass murder/suicide reflect and are produced within the social space. Thirdly, the 
article develops an account of the ways in which the affectual constellation of the radical 
loser is produced within the capitalist social formation. It does so with the paradigmatic 
example of Elliot Rodger whose world view and mass murder /suicide encapsulate the double 
economies of spiteful rage and a marketized view of sexual relations. A world view that is 
not only held by resentful online subcultures, but also reflected in popular culture. 
Specifically, the work of the best-selling author Houellebecq whose fictional account of 
marketized sexual relations has a diagnostic value for our present investigation (see Diken, 
2008:91). Finally, the article deals with the blurring or collapse of fiction and reality into 
integral violence, or the ecstasy of violence in which the separation of the body from 
experience, or simulated experience is countered by the “spectacular” mass murderer James 
Egan Holms (the joker). Arguing mass murder/suicide can be interpreted as the violent 
counter transference, or reversal of our experience as simulation. 
 
The loser and the radical loser 
What is a loser? The question invites a range of childish, banal, common-sense and pejorative 
answers from the bloated, self-satisfied and self-proclaimed winners of neoliberal capitalism. 
One rarely stops to ponder the question ‘Am I a loser?’.  As I will argue such self- reflexivity 
is a key entry point for understanding the lone mass murderer and their increasing 
significance and prevalence in contemporary social life. My contention is that what 
constitutes a loser undergoes a significant transformation in modernity, reaching its peak in 
neoliberal capitalist social formations. As a preliminary definition of a loser, following 
Nietzsche (1996:10-11), losers emerge from a confrontation of apposing systems of values, 
namely noble and slave moralities. The archetypal loser in Nietzsche’s (1996) “On the 
Genealogy of Morals” is the priestly aristocracy, who originally emerged as the losers of the 
confrontation with knightly aristocrats, this situation was of course later reversed during what 
Nietzsche (1996:13) called the slave revolt in morality. However, the basic argument from 
this perspective is that the loser is the defender of a defeated system of values, the loser thus 
emerges from a confrontation between two groups with opposing values. Taking this 
definition as our point of departure, let us look at what the loser is in contemporary social 
life.  
 
According to Sloterdijk (2010:40), “Modernity has invented the loser. This figure, which one 
meets halfway between yesterday's exploited and today's and tomorrow's superfluous, is the 
misunderstood product of the power games of democracies”. Today the loser is a taken for 
granted, banal and permanent occupant in contemporary social life. The triumph of neoliberal 
economics, its emphasis on ruthless competition in conjunction with the citizens desire and 
striving for the scarce and “ specific forms of recognition manifested in prestige, wealth, 
sexual advantage, and intellectual superiority” means in liberal democracies there will always 
be  a large reservoir of losers (Sloterdijk, 2010:39,40). In the neoliberal society of individuals 
and free market competition, or “the society without society” (See Rossi, 2018:3) winning 
and losing becomes the dominant form of ideological and economic differentiation 
supplanting that of class conflict. As I will argue throughout the article, this ideological form 
of differentiation that places the emphasis on the individual provides a social context from 
which, the lone mass murderer or radical loser emerges. Thus, in contrast to Sloterdijk, it is 
not the loser that is the misunderstood product of modernity, but the radical loser, the 
subterranean other of contemporary social life that must be distinguished from the loser. 
 
The loser in the neoliberal society takes many forms and responds to their circumstances in a 
variety of ways, there are those who are resigned and accept their fate, those who compose 
themselves and re-enter the competition and victims who demand compensation and 
reparation for their loss (Enzensberger, 2005). However, the radical loser responds by 
isolating themselves, planning and anticipating their hour of revenge (Enzensberger, 2005). 
What the loser who resigns themselves to their fate and the radical loser have in common is 
ressentiment, understood as a state of being in which powerful emotions such as anger, hate 
or envy cannot find an outlet and are thus turned inwards (Scheler, 1994:31). Such powerful 
emotions cannot find an outlet as according to Nietzsche (1996:15), the man of ressentiment 
is marked by weakness and an inability to act. Consequently, their memory replaces action, 
the resentful loser can only respond to their memories and imagine revenge. Take for 
example, Dostoyevsky’s (1992: 19) underground man…  
 
There, in its loathsome, stinking underground, our offended, beaten-down, and 
derided mouse at once immerses itself in cold, venomous, and, above all, everlasting 
spite. For forty years on end…it will recall everything, go over everything   
 
The underground man describes himself as a spiteful man that “in reality could never become 
spiteful” (Dostoyevsky, 1992:14). Here in lies a crucial difference between the loser and the 
radical loser. The radical loser is not content with simply imagining revenge, their spite must 
be actualised, their pain must be shared with those who are seen as having a lack of pain 
(Sloterdijk, 2010: 56).  The formation of this desire involves the radical loser taking an active 
role in the formation of their subjectivity as a loser. For the loser to become a radical loser 
they must adopt the judgement of those who consider themselves winners, saying to 
themselves “I am a loser and nothing but a loser” (Enzensberger, 2005). A contemporary 
example of this can be found in the adoption of a social Darwinian philosophy by Eric Harris, 
who wrote of his admiration of natural selection in his diary and on the day of the massacre 
wore a T-shirt with ‘natural selection’ printed on it (Berardi, 2015:37). The adoption of a pro 
natural selection philosophy is significant for Berardi as it reflects the killer’s social 
education in the neoliberal age in which the strong have the right to win and dominate the 
weak.   
 
 The young man knew very well that he was not going to be a winner in the social 
game. Instead, he decides that he will be a winner for a moment: I’ll kill and I’ll win: 
then I’ll die. The murderous action is conceived as revenge for the humiliation that he 
has suffered in the daily game of competition (Berardi. 2015:37) 
 
The radical loser thus mirrors and adopts the rules of the social, their act is a nihilistic 
extension and intensification and one may say logical consequence of widely accepted 
hierarchies based on competition and the so called “survival and triumph of the fittest”.  
Indeed, following Berardi 2015:38), the psychology of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold could 
be synthetically described “as a suicidal form of the Neoliberal will to win”. From this 
perspective that which constitutes a significant aspect of contemporary social life establishes 
and destroys the social. Spite is significant in this context: it is produced within the social 
space as a continual threat of disintegration and disorder (Diken, 2008:28). Spite is an affect 
without society, it does not just threaten the other, it extends beyond the individual blurring 
the line between the perpetrator and the victim. One of the ways spite has been articulated is 
as “running amok”. According to Berardi (2015) running amok is an expression that comes 
from the Malay language.  
 
In the original Malaysian context, a man who has previously shown no signs of 
violent anger acquires a weapon and, in a sudden frenzy, kills or injures anyone in the 
vicinity. Running amok is a way of re-establishing one’s reputation as a man to be 
feared and respected but is also a way of escaping the world when life has become 
intolerable, and generally culminates in suicide. It’s a culture-bound syndrome, whose 
manifestations are shaped by the cultural context and expectations. (Berardi, 
2015:40).  
 
Running amok thus combines a depressive paralysis with Thymotic impulses, which 
according to Sloterdijk (2010:11) is the part of the soul the ancients believed was responsible 
for rage, pride and the desire for respect and recognition. The violent breaking out of a 
depressive paralysis resulting from identifying as a loser is seen as the only means of 
attaining a feeling of power, it confirms ones existence in the moment of destroying the self 
and the other. It is spite that enables the radical loser to attain a feeling of power, winning for 
one moment before their own life ends. 
  
Significantly however, spite is not just a means of attaining a feeling of power and breaking 
out of depressive paralysis. The harm of oneself, the renunciation of enjoyment and the 
immersion in pain and illusion brings with it a form of enjoyment. Indeed, according to 
Diken (2009:99) “Enjoyment and the renunciation of it are not opposing but complementary 
flows. That is, the ‘radical loser’ seeks equality in destruction of others together with 
himself”. The radical loser can only imagine a worsening of the evil conditions under which 
they suffer by extending their pain to the other. Thus, the radical losers demand for justice 
“emerges as the demand for the curtailment of the others enjoyment “since it is not possible 
to impose equal jouissance, what one can impose is only the equally shared prohibition” 
(Diken, 2009:99). It is through this equal prohibition the radical loser is able to turn 
renunciation into enjoyment. It can therefore be argued that spite is an extension to the other 
of one’s own asceticism, understood as self-denial and the infliction of pain upon oneself (see 
Nietzsche 1996:11). Thus, in the climactic moment of actualised spite or “When running 
amok, the borders between one’s body and the surrounding universe are blurred, and so is the 
limit between killing and being killed” (Berardi 2015:40).  To understand this extension of 
the ascetic ideal to the other, it is worth discussing Diken’s theorisation of the genealogy of 
nihilism.  
  
Radical and passive nihilism. 
 
Where is God gone? ... I mean to tell you! We have killed him, – you and I! We are all his 
murderers! (Nietzsche,1960: 167) 
 
For Nietzsche (1967:9), the meaning of the death of god is that the highest values devaluate 
themselves. That is to say, belief in god, the “reality principle” the meta-physical reality that 
gave our world meaning collapses into the actual (see Baudrillard, 2005:18). The result is the 
emergence of two distinct, existential, subjective dispositions, the radical nihilist and the 
passive nihilist (Diken, 2008:22-27). The radical nihilist responds to the death of God with 
despair, the systematic undermining of belief in the monotheistic God and the otherworldly 
values he represents, pushes him to cling all the more desperately to his faith in these things. 
However, due to the world consistently undermining this faith, the radical nihilist is forced to 
accept the “absolute untenability of existence when it comes to the highest values one 
recognises” (Nietzsche, 1967: 3). The radical nihilist is left with absolute values that cannot 
find a place in this world and due to their desperate attachment to these values “they judge of 
the world as it is that it ought not to be” (Nietzsche, 1967: 318). With radical nihilism the link 
between man and God, this world and the next is severed.  Existence in this world is no 
longer seen as the pre-condition to the next (Diken, 2008:27). That is to say, the radical 
nihilist’s reduction of the world to nothingness by judgement is followed by a reduction of 
the world to nothing by hand (Nietzsche, 1967:18). This world’s destruction becomes the 
precondition to the next. Unlike the subjects included in a Christian collective, who according 
to Sloterdijk, (2010:35) were pacified because they were able to invest and defer their rage in 
God, who functioned as a kind of large-scale rage bank. The radical nihilist becomes a direct 
instrument of God, bringing about this world’s destruction themselves. Thus, with radical 
nihilism, the ascetic ideal once meant to pacify the explosive materials of ressentiment 
becomes an active “will” invested in this world (Diken, 2008:27). The destruction of 
themselves and the world is the means by which the radical nihilist can touch the real, realise 
what cannot be realised, that absolute ideal that cannot be found in this world.  
 
In contrast to the radical nihilist, the passive nihilist responds to the death of god by accepting 
the end of those old religious values, concluding they live in a world without values (Diken, 
2008:23). The passive nihilist accepts the impossibility of different forms of evaluation and 
thus the impossibility of placing a distance between the actual reality and the virtual, a 
domain that extends beyond the actual which enables differing and active forms of 
evaluation. Indeed, the passive nihilist is caught in a paradox whereby they cannot endure 
this world while they simultaneously cannot deny it (Nietzsche, 1967). Consequently, the 
passive nihilists existence is reactive, whereas the ascetic in the case of the radical nihilist is 
an active will invested in the production of pain: the passive nihilist avoids pain by denying 
their own will (Diken, 2008:23). The passive nihilists nothingness of the will separates 
happiness from action, reducing life to modest pleasures. This is Nietzsche’s last man who 
has abandoned those places that are too hard to live in, who make themselves and the earth 
small “They have their little pleasures for the day, and their little pleasures for the night, but 
they have a regard for health.  “We have discovered happiness,”—say the last men, and blink 
thereby” (Nietzsche, 2016:26).  
 
So, there we have it, the two losers of modernity, the loser who chooses to live in a world of 
passivity and modest pleasures and the radical loser who cannot accept their highest values 
do not have a place in this world and thus will nothingness rather than not willing. Crucially 
in this context although these nihilisms are juxtaposed to one another they operate within the 
same social space (Diken, 2008:3). Their relationship is one of a non-dialectical, disjunctive 
synthesis in which the injunction for moderation is paired with the desire for extremity (see 
Diken, 2008:3). It is this nihilistic deadlock that is characteristic of our social space, 
suggesting that the running amuck of the radical loser is produced and paired with the society 
of spectacular, simulated pleasure. Indeed, I stated in the beginning of the article, new terror 
is a radical nihilist gesture, the act is beyond politics and ideology, it is the paradoxical 
moment in which the unrealisable ideal is touched in the moment of destruction. This ideal 
does not have to be that of god, although terrorism in the name of god is still a persistent 
phenomenon in late capitalist societies. Against the relativism and nothingness of the will 
that characterises the passive nihilist, the radical nihilist would rather will nothingness in the 
name of an absolute value. We are thus confronted by a picture of the social space 
characterised by an oscillation between value relativism and value absolutism, the will to 
nothingness and the nothingness of the will. Significantly for our own discussion, returning to 
the preliminary definition of a loser as the holder of a defeated system of values emerging 
from an authentic conflict. With the disjunctive synthesis of the loser and the radical loser, of 
value relativism and impossible values, there can be no winner as there is no authentic 
conflict. In this picture of the social space neither side can emerge victorious. To make the 
claim, that there are no winners, only losers and radical losers sounds paradoxical, how can 
one lose if no one can win? - although the conflict is a false one it is nonetheless a conflict, 
but a conflict that cannot resolve itself. From this perspective I would argue there can only 
emerge losers. 
  
Dual economy of spiteful rage and commodified sexual relations 
 
I will torture some of the good looking people before I kill them, assuming that the 
good looking ones had the best sex lives. All of that pleasure they had in life, I will 
punish by bringing them pain and suffering. I have lived a life of pain and suffering, 
and it was time to bring that pain to people who actually deserve it. (Rodger, 
2014:132) 
 
This quotation is taken from the mass murderer Elliot Rodger’s manifesto “My twisted 
world”, who on the evening of May 23rd, 2014 killed six people and injured fourteen others. 
After he stabs his flatmates and shoots three women outside a sorority house, he exchanges 
gun fire with police officers while speeding through Isla Vista California firing his weapons 
at pedestrians and hitting them with his car. The rampage came to an end when he crashed 
into a parked car and took his own life. There are clearly misogynistic, racist, elitist and 
narcissistic motivations for his attack detailed in his journal.  Both his manifesto and his 
YouTube videos go into extensive details about his sexual frustration and his resentment 
towards women who would not sleep with him as well as men who were sexually active, 
“especially good-looking ones” (Rodger, 2014:132). In addition, Rodgers demands include 
those for justice, recognition and the forcing of the world to fit his own desires 
 
I spent more time studying the world, seeing the world for the horrible, unfair place it 
is. I then had the revelation that just because I was condemned to suffer a life of 
loneliness and rejection, doesn’t mean I am insignificant. I have an exceptionally high 
level of intelligence. I see the world differently than anyone else. Because of all of the 
injustices I went through and the worldview I developed because of them; I must be 
destined for greatness. I must be destined to change the world, to shape it into an 
image that suits me! (Rodger, 2014:56) 
 
To understand these dimensions of Rodger’s mass murder/suicide in their full totality and 
social context it is my contention they must be understood as a spiteful, rage economy 
produced within the framework of the capitalist social formation. This section of the article 
thus takes the affectual constellation of Rodger as a paradigmatic case for the exploration of 
the disjunctive synthesis of radical and passive nihilism as manifested in the capitalist social 
formation. According to Simmel (2012:35), the modus operandi of the capitalist economy is 
the frightful levelling of all things, the abolition of qualitative value for the quantitative 
common denominator that is money. Indeed, capitalist exchange takes place independently of 
the values of the seller and the buyer, reducing the relationship between things and people to 
what is “objectively perceivable” (Simmel, 2012:32). Put differently, capitalism sets into 
motion the process Marx described as commodity fetishism, in which the commodity’s 
colonisation of social life for Debord (1994:13) was completed in the historical moment 
which corresponds to the spectacle. For Diken (2008:70) “the capitalist concept of value is 
nihilistic: capital as an abstract entity that, instead of relating itself to an exteriority, relates 
itself only to itself, or, ‘re-enters’ itself.”.  Furthermore, it is the logic of surplus value which 
necessitates the separation of one’s personal values from their engagement with people and 
things, making capitalism the age of the greatest cynicism (see Deleuze and Guatarri 
1983:222). Capitalist cynicism makes it so those inferior, reactive forces concerned with self-
preservation triumph over the superior active forces that animate noble forms of evaluation 
(See Deleuze, 2006:58). Thus, with capitalism, weakness and wealth are not opposed but 
complementary flows. One can be “successful” and marked by a fundamental weakness. 
Hence anyone in this sociality can become a radical loser, mass murder/suicide cannot be 
explained on the basis of economic impoverishment.  
 
Despite the cynicism of the monetary economy reducing all people values and things to what 
is objectively perceivable it brings with it a nihilistic form of enjoyment. An enjoyment of 
this very process, namely the enjoyment of the reduction of all things to something 
purchasable (Diken, 2008:69).  The reduction and concentration of purchasable things 
stimulates the individual to the highest degree of nervous energy (Simmel, 2012:35). Further, 
the reduction of people and things to what is objectively perceivable is coupled with the 
augmentation of needs “The spectacle is a permanent opium war waged to make it impossible 
to distinguish goods from commodities, or true satisfaction from a survival that increases 
according to its own logic” (Debord, 1994:13). The logic of capitalist accumulation from this 
perspective increases what can be purchased, blurring the lines between the feeling of 
satisfaction or its artificial or simulated form. With neoliberalism and its anthropotechnical 
project of scripting all the excessive dimensions of humanity, their passions, desires, 
emotions to economic principles (see Rossi, 2018:1) results in their derisory preservation.   
We can observe this derisory preservation in the commodity as spectacle, which attempts to 
separate reality and the image (Debord, 1994:5-6). One way in which this separation 
manifests itself is through the de-coupling of commodities from their malignant substances 
(see Žižek, 2004). That is to say products such as alcohol-free beer or decaffeinated coffee 
signify a post-modern injunction for moderation, it is a modest pleasure of the passive 
nihilist.  What is significant about these seemingly banal products is the removal of the 
bodily experience by the commodity understood as the direct embodiment of fetish value, 
whose relationship to the real is purely spectral (See Diken, 2008:69). In the case of Eliot 
Rodger, the experience of this separation between reality and the image in his own life can be 
encapsulated with reference to Houellebecq’s novel “The possibility of an island”  
 
…to increase desires to an unbearable level whilst making the fulfilment of them 
more and more inaccessible: this was the single principle upon which Western society 
was based. (Houellebecq 2005: 57) 
 
Rodger documents his daily experience as one of miserable loneliness, rejection and 
insignificance in which his desire to enjoy sexual advantage is concurrent with is rage and 
ressentiment. “I found some posts on the internet about teenagers having sex, and I was once 
again reminded of the life I had been denied… I developed extreme feelings of envy, hatred, 
and anger towards anyone who has a sex life” (Rodger, 2014:56). What is significant in 
Rodger’s description of his loneliness and the reasons for this is the lack of substance he 
attributes to the other, his enemies. When he talks about his enemies, they have no names 
they are simply “males” and “females’ bare life, bodies without names who possess 
something he does not and who are therefore worthy victims of extreme cruelty. “I wanted to 
kill them slowly… They deserve it. The males deserve it for taking the females away from 
me, and the females deserve it for choosing those males instead of me.” (2014:87). Such a 
logic is reminiscent of Simmel’s description of the reduction of the relationship between 
people to what is objectively perceivable (2012:35). Rodger’s rage at the other was not a 
result of a love rivalry in which he was the loser nor was it one of direct rejection from a 
woman whom he had strong feelings for. His anger was towards all women who would not 
give him what they possess in his view (sex) and all men who kept this resource for 
themselves. Rodger’s perception and depiction of sexual relations is like that of the author 
Houellebecq who depicts sex as a naked spectacle with no seduction. “On the sexual level 
there were those who aroused desire, and those who did not” (Houellebecq, 2005:21).   
 
This form of sexual differentiation in Houellebecq follows the logic of a marketized society 
in which sexual life is reduced to what is objectively perceivable, one’s desirability which 
corresponds to one’s sexual market value. Hence his emphasis on the values of “beauty, 
youth, wealth, ambition, and sex” (Houellebecq, 2005:21). Following the same logic, for 
Rodger sex functioned like that of capital and creates the perception that the neoliberal 
ideological distinction between winners and losers extends to sexual life. Indeed, much like 
“In a totally liberal economic system, certain people accumulate considerable fortunes: others 
stagnate in unemployment in misery. In a totally liberal sexual system, certain people have a 
varied and exciting erotic life: others are reduced to masturbation and solitude.” 
(Houellebecq, 1998:99). In the fictional world of Houellebecq, this struggle against the 
sexually advantaged can culminate in the injunction for equal enjoyment “a demand for 
sexual ‘justice’ through which everybody can have free access to everybody’s body” (Diken, 
2008:98). However, in actuality as it is impossible to impose equal enjoyment, Rodger’s spite 
attempted to impose an equal prohibition. Rodger responded to the perceived excess 
enjoyment of the other through the redistribution of his pain to those who are perceived as 
acutely lacking pain (See Sloterdijk, 2010:63). Hence Rodger’s (2014:132) desire to punish 
those with “the best sex lives” repaying their pleasure in life with pain and death. Following a 
perspective that is perfectly in accordance with a society of Market led values, Rodger’s pain 
and ressentiment was exaggerated to the point it was able to transcend a depressive paralysis 
(See Sloterdijk, 2010:55). Believing he was the loser of marketized rules of sexual life, 
Rodger’s concomitant rage economy culminated in a spiteful equalisation, a suicidal will to 
win for a moment. What Rodger was responding to was the spectacle itself. Indeed, today the 
injunction is to enjoy, and guilt emerges from one’s inability to enjoy rather than as a result 
of excessive enjoyment. What Rodger was unable to see is there can be no winners in a 
system of marketized sexual relations as it attempts to reduce the subjective experience to a 
quantifiable possession which individuals are continually pressured to display. That is the 
real kernel of the problem that links Rodger’s subjective experience to the generalised 
experience of the spectacle, namely the gap between reality and the image. What Rodger did 
was mistake the image for reality, attacking the real when his actual target was the image.  
Thus the antagonism is not between sexual success and failure, but between seduction and the 
obscene, between the injunction to simulate enjoyment and the refusal to do so.  
 
 
Spectacular mass murder or the ecstasy of violence. 
 The logic that is characteristic of the spectacle, of the separation of reality and the image is 
coming to increasingly dominate all aspects of experience. Indeed, through pornography one 
can simulate sex that is devoid of sex, and its affectual relation to the body of the other: one 
can kill without killing either through video games or vicariously through the simulated 
adventure of the hero or villain in the cinema, video game or television. Crucially in this 
context following Berardi (2015:35) we must avoid a superficial conclusion that it is the 
content of violent video games or films that de-sensitise one to the bodily experience of pain 
and cruelty.  it is Rather “the stimulation itself, that produces the effect of desensitization to 
the bodily experience of suffering and of pleasure” (Beradi, 2015:35).  On the one hand one 
could argue this situation is reminiscent of Baudrillard’s (1997:451) extreme phenomena: 
those which occur beyond the end of the real, the paradoxical end of an idea via its 
excessiveness “(extreme = exterminis)”. However, Baudrillard himself knew that processes 
of hyper realisation or integralisation understood as the “perpetrating on the world of an 
unlimited operational project whereby everything becomes real, everything becomes visible 
and transparent, everything is 'liberated” is subject to reversal and a violent counter 
transference (see Baudrillard, 2005:17-185).  Put differently, we can argue mass murder is 
the violent return of the real which the spectacle has sought to conceal or exorcise. That is to 
say, the deficit of the real and real bodily experience is paired with the ultra-real or excessive 
perpetration of violence upon the body, a radical nihilist’s desire for extremity against the 
passive nihilist’s injunction for moderation, the separation of the body or will from the 
objects of desire. This argument is perhaps best exemplified by the actions of the mass 
murderer James Eagan Holmes who thought of himself as the joker from the Batman comics.  
On the twentieth of July 2012 Holmes entered a century 16 movie theatre that was showing 
the latest batman film “Batman the Dark Knight Rises” and opened fire on the people inside 
killing 12 and injuring 70 others.  What is significant about this mass shooting is its location, 
namely a cinema, the perfect embodiment of the society of the spectacle, the separation of the 
real and the image.  Following Berardi(2015:33), Holms developed and subverted the 
relationship between crime and the media …  
 
While Harris and Klebold were hoping for Spielberg’s attention, Holmes was already 
mimicking a character from Nolan’s movie. Holmes is already part of the world of 
Batman, reconfiguring DC’s creation in reality, dissolving the boundary of the screen 
and forcing the audience to participate in the story that they have chosen merely to 
watch. For the spectacular mass murderer, the aim is to break the mirror of the 
spectacle. For him, the border between reality and imagination are blurred, indistinct, 
distorted. He wants to take part in the spectacle, so that the spectacle may become 
life, and - ultimately - death.  
 
It could be argued the actions of both Holmes and Rodger can be understood as the 
paradoxical ecstasy of simulated bodily experience, its violent counter transference in which 
the separation between the image and reality is forced together. The difference is that Holmes 
intentionally mimicked the spectacle attempting to make it a part of real life and real death. 
Rodger mistook the spectacle for the real, attacking the real when it was the naked spectacle 
of marketized sexual relations that was his real enemy. 
  
Conclusion 
To conclude, what the two losers of modernity fail to comprehend is their proximity to one 
another, the radical loser sees in the passive nihilist a winner of the social game without 
considering that there can be no winner in the social game, that the neoliberal ideological 
construction of winners and losers amounts in actuality to a disjunctive synthesis. A false and 
staged conflict in which there can be no winner only losers and radical losers. On the other 
hand, the passive nihilist never stops to think that they too are a loser. For the passive nihilist 
or loser of modernity people like Rodger are uncanny because contrary to the popular slogan 
for serial killer documentaries “entering the mind of a serial killer”, we too are already half 
occupying the mentality that fuels systemic acts of spite. If we accept the logic of 
neoliberalism, then we are participating in the production of radical losers. Indeed, we can 
argue with Berardi (2015:4) that with neoliberalism the age of heroes comes to an end, 
supplanted by the commodified hero. The spectacle’s colonisation of social life means one 
comes to see their very subjectivity, their very existence as a spectacle for the others 
consumption, a disposition that is encapsulated by Mae, the protagonist of Eggers dystopic 
novel ‘‘The Circle’’ “I want to be seen. I want proof I existed” (Eggers, 2013:484). What the 
radical loser does is take this desire to its logical extreme, ignored in life but recognised in 
death as an abject hero, the joker or the supreme gentleman, he does not subvert the spectacle 
but affirms its hyper negative terroristic dimension. As Baudrillard (2003:414) puts it ‘‘the 
spectacle of terrorism imposes the terrorism of the spectacle”. What makes the mass 
murderer a new terrorist is their perverse affirmation of a negative sociality, a hyperreal 
violence produced by a hyperreal society. Thus, their violence could be characterised as a 
resentful and desperate performance, that although produces fear, shock and moral outrage 
expresses the internal affects and desires of a commodified, vacuous pseudo culture. The 
mirror image of a butchered sociality in which the will to participate in the spectacle results 
in real death and the spectacle of death.  
 
What we are left with then is the question concerning how this deadlock between losers and 
radical losers, between radical and passive nihilists can be over-come? How might thymotic 
impulses be productively channelled towards the trans-valuation of value relativism and 
value absolutism which are informed by the concomitant affects of spite and passivity 
without returning to a transcendental reality principle. Indeed, whether there are examples of 
a kind of large-scale secular rage bank pacifying radical nihilism is an investigation beyond 
the scope of this article. However, the line of argumentation I have pursued suggests that if 
we are to plot a course towards a sociality that is not caught in this vicious cycle the answer 
does not lay in “Breaking” the mirror of the spectacle”. Rather, it may consist of “Over-
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